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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
David Charles Glodowski appeals from his conviction for failing to update his sex
offender registration. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred when it concluded that the
crime he committed in Wisconsin required his continued registration as a sex offender in Idaho,
and that the district court committed fundamental error by using an instruction requested by
Glodowski below, which was based on the pattern instructions.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On December 7, 2005, Glodowski, then 19, met N.S., a 14-year-old runaway, at a party at
his house. (PSI, pp.23, 62.) N.S. claimed that Glodowski kissed her, fondled her, and ultimately
raped her, both that evening and the following morning. (PSI, pp.23, 62-63.) Glodowski denied
that they had sex, but admitted that he sexually fondled and kissed the 14-year-old girl. (PSI,
p.23.) Wisconsin authorities charged Glodowski with repeated sexual assault of the same child,
two counts of second degree sexual assault of a child, and third degree sexual assault. (PSI,
p.22.) The first count was dismissed and the others amended to third degree sexual assault, and
Glodowski pleaded guilty. (PSI, pp.10, 22.) Thereafter, Glodowski was required to register as a
sex offender in Wisconsin. (PSI, p.11.) After he moved to Idaho, state authorities reviewed
Glodowski’s Wisconsin conviction and determined that it was substantially similar to lewd
conduct, I.C. § 18-1508, which required that Glodowski continue to register. (PSI, p.20.)
When Glodowski moved to Idaho in 2014, he completed a new sex offender registration,
which he was required to update every four months. (Id.) He was consistently late with these
updates, but the department was very patient: The first time he failed to update his registration
for more than a month, he rectified the problem after he was notified and no action was taken.
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(Id.) Over the next three times he failed to confirm or update his registration, he was only given
a verbal warning. (Id.) Then the mail service returned his registration paperwork, undelivered,
and officers learned that Glodowski had actually moved, yet still took no action after Glodowski
registered his new address. (Id.) The following year, Glodowski again became noncompliant
with his registration requirements, and in June 2017, officers learned that he had again moved,
months earlier, without notifying anyone. (Id.)
The state charged Glodowski with failing to update his sex offender registration after he
changed addresses, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8309. (R., pp.30-31.) The case went to trial
(see 4/4/2017 Tr.), after which the jury returned a guilty verdict (R., p.103). The district court
entered judgment against Glodowski and sentenced him to a unified term of three years with one
year fixed, suspended that sentence, and placed him on probation for a period of two years. (R.,
pp.108-12.) Glodowski filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.119-23.)
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ISSUES
Glodowski states the issues on appeal as:
I.
Did the district court err in concluding the crime of third degree sexual
assault as defined in Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.225(3) is substantially equivalent to
either rape, as defined in Idaho Code § 18-6101, or lewd conduct with minor child
under sixteen, as defined in Idaho Code § 18-1508?
II.
Did the district court commit fundamental error when it failed to instruct
the jury regarding the knowledge element of the offense?
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Glodowski failed to show that the district court erred when it granted the state’s
motion in limine after correctly concluding that third degree sexual assault in Wisconsin was the
substantial equivalent of lewd and lascivious conduct or certain forms of rape in Idaho?
2.

Has Glodowski failed to establish fundamental error in the district court’s instructions?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Glodowski Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Granted The State’s
Motion In Limine
A.

Introduction
Prior to trial, the state filed a motion in limine asking the district court to determine that

third degree sexual assault in Wisconsin was substantially equivalent to lewd conduct and certain
forms of rape in Idaho. (See 4/3/2017 Tr., p.15, L.15 – p.18, L.1.) After reviewing the statutes
and applying the correct legal standards, the district court granted the state’s motion in limine.
(See R., p.52; 4/3/2017 Tr., p.22, L.16 – p.28, L.20.) Glodowski now appeals, asserting that the
district court erred when it concluded that the statutes were substantially equivalent.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-7.) Review of the record, including Glodowski’s underlying Wisconsin
judgment and the various statutes, shows no error by the district court. The district court should
be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether two statutes are substantially equivalent to each other is an issue of statutory

interpretation, and statutory interpretation raises a question of law. Doe v. State, 158 Idaho 778,
782, 352 P.3d 500, 504 (2015).

C.

The Crime Glodowski Committed In Wisconsin Is Substantially Equivalent To
Registerable Offenses In The State Of Idaho
The district court concluded that the offense for which Glodowski was convicted in

Wisconsin, third degree sexual assault, was substantially equivalent to the crimes of rape and
lewd conduct in Idaho. (R., p.52; 4/3/2017 Tr., p.22, L.16 – p.28, L.20.) The Court’s “only
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focus in determining whether two offenses are substantially equivalent is the elements of each
offense.” Doe, 158 Idaho at 782-83, 352 P.3d at 504-05. Review of the elements of the
registrable offense that Glodowski committed in Wisconsin shows that it is substantially
equivalent to similar offenses proscribed in the State of Idaho.
In Wisconsin, third degree sexual assault proscribes either nonconsensual sexual
intercourse or nonconsensual sexual contact. Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3). “Sexual intercourse” is
defined not only as genital-genital contact, but also includes oral-genital and anal-genital contact,
and any penetration of the anal or genital opening with any object. Wis. Stat. § 940.225(5)(c).
Sexual contact, for purposes of the statute, includes the intentional ejaculation, urination, or
defecation of either party on the other, for the intent of the sexual arousal or gratification of the
defendant, or the humiliation of the victim. Wis. Stat. § 940.225(5)(b)(2) and (3).
Similar to the Wisconsin statute, Idaho Code § 18-6101 proscribes nonconsensual sexual
intercourse, of the genital-genital contact variety, and Idaho Code § 18-6605 proscribes
nonconsensual sexual intercourse of all other varieties. See State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 669-70,
534 P.2d 1107, 1109-10 (1975); State v. Altwatter, 29 Idaho 107, 157 P. 256 (1916). Similarly,
taken together, Idaho Code §§ 18-1506 and 18-1508 proscribe all sexual contact committed
against a minor child less than 16 years of age; Idaho Code § 18-1508A proscribes such contact
committed against a minor of 16 or 17 years of age; and Idaho Code § 18-1505B proscribes all
sexual contact committed against vulnerable adults. Idaho Code § 18-6608 also proscribes the
forcible penetration of the anal or vaginal openings by any foreign object.

Sex offender

registration in Idaho is required for violations of any of these statutes. See I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a).
Thus, though not identical and arguably broader in some respects, the Wisconsin statute is
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substantially equivalent to the Idaho statutes, and the district court correctly granted the state’s
motion in limine.
On appeal, Glodowski asserts that the district court erred when it concluded that the
Wisconsin crime was substantially similar to Idaho offenses requiring registration because, he
argues, lewd conduct, I.C. § 18-1508, only applies where the victim is less than 16 years old and
third degree sexual assault, Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3), applies at any age. (Appellant’s brief, pp.47.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, the only difference between the statutes, at least
according to Glodowski, is the victim’s age requirements, and in Doe the Idaho Supreme Court
rejected the argument that differences related to the victim’s age were sufficient to overcome the
otherwise substantially equivalent nature of two statutes. See Doe, 158 Idaho at 783, 352 P.3d at
505. Second, the age-related differences were not actually relevant to this case.
The judgment of conviction entered against Glodowski not only showed that he was
convicted, pursuant to his guilty plea, of Third Degree Sexual Assault under Wisconsin Code
§ 940.225(3), it also showed that the crime was amended from Second Degree Sexual Assault of
a Child under Wisconsin Code § 948.02(2). (PSI, p.10.) That latter statute proscribes “sexual
contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 16 years.” Wis. Stat.
§ 948.02(2). While that proscription alone does not make clear whether Glodowski’s conduct
violated Idaho Code § 18-1506 (sexual abuse of a child) or § 18-1508 (lewd conduct with a
child), both are offenses for which he would be required to register. See I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a).
And in either case, the original charge constitutes substantial evidence that his victim was under
the age of 16. Thus, even if the crimes committed by Glodowski in Wisconsin had to be
identical to acts proscribed by statute in the State of Idaho, rather than substantially equivalent,
there was sufficient evidence before the district court to reach such a conclusion.
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Moreover, the Idaho State Police determined that Glodowski was required to maintain his
sex offender registration when he first moved to Idaho in 2014. (See PSI, p.20.) Glodowski
never challenged that initial determination. And, in light of the facts underlying his actual crime
(which, though perhaps not available to the district court during the hearing on the motion in
limine, would have been available to the Idaho State Police), where Glodowski was accused of
raping a 14-year-old girl and admitted at least sexually fondling and kissing her, the Idaho State
Police was clearly correct that Glodowski had committed an offense that would require
registration in Idaho. See I.C. §§ 18-1506, 18-1508, and 18-8304(1)(a). The district court was
likewise correct to, essentially, affirm that determination when it concluded that Glodowski’s
crime of conviction, third degree sexual assault in Wisconsin, was substantially equivalent to the
crimes of either lewd conduct or rape in Idaho. Glodowski has failed to show error in that
determination. The district court should be affirmed.

II.
Glodowski Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In The District Court’s Instructions
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Glodowski argues that the district court committed

fundamental error when it gave an instruction for failure to update sex offender registration that
was based on the model instruction, I.C.J.I. 985A, which instruction was requested by
Glodowski. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-10.) Even if this were error, Glodowski would be estopped
from challenging it under the doctrine of invited error. Moreover, on the merits, he has failed to
show error, much less fundamental error entitling him to review of this unpreserved issue.
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B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the appellate

court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 853, 864-65
(2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000)). “An erroneous
instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury
or prejudiced a party.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01
(2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 462, 111 P.3d 144, 147 (2005)).

C.

Glodowski Is Estopped Under The Doctrine Of Invited Error From Challenging The
Elements Instruction Which He Requested Below
On appeal, Glodowski claims that his due process rights were violated because the

elements instruction given to the jury did not instruct it that Glodowski’s failure to update his
registration had to be “knowing.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-10.) Glodowski is estopped from
challenging this instruction, however, because he requested it. (Compare R., p.64 (Defense
Instruction No. 1) with R., p.92 (Instruction No. 9).) “It has long been the law in Idaho that one
may not successfully complain of errors one has acquiesced in or invited. Errors consented to,
acquiesced in, or invited are not reversible.” State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 379, 313 P.3d 1, 35
(2013) (quoting State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 838, 673 P.2d 436, 438 (1983)) (internal
citations omitted). The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who “caused or
played an important role in prompting a trial court” to take a particular action from “later
challenging that decision on appeal.” State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120
(1999). Because Glodowski requested the elements instruction given in his case, even assuming,
arguendo, that the instruction was erroneous, he is estopped under the doctrine of invited error
from challenging that instruction on appeal.
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D.

Glodowski Cannot Show Fundamental Error Entitling Him To Review Of His
Unpreserved Claim Of Instructional Error
Even if Glodowski were not estopped from challenging on appeal the elements

instruction he requested below, his argument would still fail. “It is a fundamental tenet of
appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is
preserved for appeal.” State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000); see
also Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865 (“An error generally is not reviewable if raised
for the first time on appeal.”) (citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966
(2003)). This same principle applies to alleged errors in jury instructions. See I.C.R. 30(b) (“No
party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects to
the action before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The objection must distinctly state the
instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.”); Draper, 151 Idaho at
588, 261 P.3d at 865. Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only
review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. Id.; see also State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Because Glodowski failed to preserve his instructional challenge below, he is required to
show fundamental error on appeal. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. To establish
fundamental error,
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged
error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights;
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.
Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Glodowski cannot meet this burden.
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First, for a constitutional error to plainly exist, it must be clear in the law. State v.
Hadden, 152 Idaho 371, 375, 271 P.3d 1227, 1231 (Ct. App. 2012). The error Glodowski
alleges, that an elements instruction on failure to update a sex offender registry requires a
“knowing” element, is not clear in the law. The instruction given in this case was based on the
model instruction for failing to annually register. (Compare R., p.92 with I.C.J.I. 985A.) That
model instruction does not contain a “knowing” element.

The model instructions are

presumptively correct statements of the law. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 n.2, 225 P.3d
700, 704 n.2 (2010); State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 85, 253 P.3d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 2011). That
presumption cannot be overcome in a challenge raised under the fundamental error standard.
Glodowski, therefore, cannot show a clear violation of a constitutional right.
Second, Glodowski cannot show the prejudice required by the fundamental error
standard. Glodowski claims that, based on the elements instruction, the jury may have “had the
impression that failure to register as a sex offender is a strict liability crime,” not requiring any
mental element. (Appellant’s brief, p.10.) When a party challenges the jury instructions, those
instructions must be considered as a whole. See Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 373-74, 247 P.3d at
600-01.

Instruction No. 5 explained that, “[t]o constitute the offense charged against the

defendant, there must be a joint operation of act or conduct and criminal intent.” (R., p.86.)
Idaho appellate courts presume that the jury followed the district court’s instructions. State v.
Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 7, 304 P.3d 276, 282 (2013); State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 222, 207 P.3d
186, 198 (Ct. App. 2009). Thus, as the instructions required the jury to find some joint operation
of criminal act and criminal intent in this case, in following those instructions it could not have
been left with the impression that failure to register was a strict liability crime.
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Glodowski cannot show clear error in the elements instruction offered in his case
because, where the presumptively correct model instruction does not include a “knowing”
element, he cannot show such an element is required. Glodowski has also failed to show
prejudice. Glodowski, therefore, has failed to show fundamental error entitling him to review of
his unpreserved instructional challenge. The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Glodowski’s conviction for failing to
update his sex offender registration.
DATED this 20th day of August, 2018.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of August, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Russell J. Spencer
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
RJS/dd
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